In the first section of this chapter, we discussed the origins of money and the transition toward precious metals like gold and silver. Although gold possessed desirable attributes for money—namely, its scarcity and durability—it proved impractical for daily transactions and posed significant risks for storage. As the accumulation of gold increased, individuals found it burdensome and hazardous to manage large quantities personally. Consequently, they turned to their local and reputable goldsmiths for secure storage. In exchange for a modest fee, goldsmiths provided a safe haven for this wealth and issued promissory notes that guaranteed redemption of the gold. These notes, representing the value of the gold stored, began to circulate as a convenient means of trade. Over time, it became evident that these notes were seldom redeemed for the actual metal; most of the gold remained untouched in the vaults. Observing this, the goldsmiths conceived a groundbreaking idea.
What if the goldsmiths could leverage the idle gold to generate income? They realized they didn’t need to loan out the physical gold itself; since people were already using their promissory notes for everyday transactions, they could simply issue new notes. This insight marked the embryonic stage of what would come to be known as “fractional reserve banking.” Instead of lending tangible gold, goldsmiths began to create and lend out additional paper notes that could be easily and cheaply made. This practice of lending paper notes effectively expanded the money supply beyond the actual gold held in the vaults, as Tarek El-Diwany explains:
“As the process of lending was contemplated, it became apparent to the bankers that there was in fact no need to lend the physical gold in their vaults. Since their own receipts were equally regarded as money by the general public, it would suffice for these receipts to be lent out as a substitute for gold coins. Such a policy had a great advantage. Paper receipts could be manufactured at very little cost, whereas gold itself could not be! For an imprudent banker it would be possible to use the entirety of the bank’s gold reserves as a ratio of receipts issued.”
El-Diwany, Tarek. The Problem with Interest, 3rd edition. Kreatoc Ltd. pp. 41-42.
But wait. Can’t the goldsmith just transact with newly created notes instead of loaning out the notes with interest? El Diwany goes further to explain why the goldsmith would rather generate revenue from interest instead of only creating new paper receipts:
“The ‘fractional reserve’ banking system described above relied crucially upon the use of interest in its operation. Why, it might be asked, did the banker not print receipts and spend them on his own consumption if it is in fact true that he had the power to manufacture money? The answer is that the act of spending his receipts would eventually lead to bankruptcy. If such a course were followed, it would be almost certain that at some future time the spent receipts would return for redemption in gold – gold which never existed in the first instance. By lending the receipts instead, the banker could charge interest on the amount lent. Upon repayment of the loan, the receipts could be destroyed as easily as they had been manufactured. But the interest charge would remain as revenue.”
El-Diwany, Tarek. The Problem with Interest, 3rd edition. Kreatoc Ltd. pp. 42.
Understanding the transition from traditional usury laws to the principles of modern fractional reserve banking is pivotal in grasping the genesis of modern banking. Historically, the prohibition of usury posed a significant barrier to the development of banking as we know it today. For fractional reserve banking to thrive, this restriction needed to be relaxed or circumvented. Indeed, without the ability to charge interest, goldsmiths could still issue paper money against unbacked gold, but, as El-Diwnay alluded to, doing so would increase the risk of customers demanding redemption of their notes for actual gold, potentially collapsing the system.
Thus, charging interest on loans became the crucial mechanism that allowed these early bankers to profit while maintaining the circulation of their paper notes. Interest not only made the operations of fractional reserve banking viable, but, more importantly, it made it sustainable and self-perpetuating. It incentivized the issuance and circulation of paper money and debt, which is essentially what modern fiat currency relies on. In our opinion, usury, once viewed critically and through the history of its gradual acceptance, became a cornerstone that facilitated the expansion and widespread acceptance of fiat money throughout modern civilizations.
So we know that usury was a necessary component of the development of modern banking, but how did modern banking first originate? The traces of modern deposit banking can be traced back as early as the 13th century to European commercial civilizations in Italy, most notably Venice and Florence.
In Venice, the development of banking was closely tied to its position as a major trade hub in the Mediterranean. The largest bank in Venice in 1584, the house of Pisano and Tiepolo, failed due to its practice of lending against its reserves, leading to its inability to refund depositors. In response, the government established the Banco della Piazza del Rialto, a state bank that was prohibited from making loans and could only generate income through fees for services like coin storage and currency exchange. The bank became highly successful and central to Venetian commerce by keeping 100% of its deposits, and it issued trusted paper receipts that were actually valued more highly than gold coins due to their consistent reliability. However, as competition and the scale of commerce grew, these banks gradually shifted towards fractional reserve banking, where they kept only a fraction of deposits as cash on hand. This transition was marked by the emergence of the Banco del Giro in 1619, which operated on this banking model, allowing it to extend its influence by financing government debt, but it was also very susceptible to crises when too many depositors sought to withdraw their funds at once.
In Florence, banking evolved from the financial activities of wealthy merchant families like the Bardi and Peruzzi in the 13th and 14th centuries. These families initially managed their banking operations with relatively conservative practices, but as their operations expanded to support international trade and the financial needs of European monarchies, they increasingly adopted fractional reserve banking. One notable example is the Medici Bank established in 1397, which leveraged deposits to issue loans to fund various ventures during the Renaissance. A balance sheet from the London branch of the Medici Bank revealed that a large portion of the bank’s liabilities were in the form of demand deposits, with reserves at only 50% of these liabilities, indicating a credit expansion ratio of two times the received deposits.1 This ratio deteriorated further after 1464, signaling the onset of financial troubles. As the economic conditions reversed, driven by credit extended without corresponding real savings, the Medici Bank, like its contemporaries, faced an inevitable recession and credit squeeze, which forced them into a policy of credit restriction and loan recalls in a vain attempt to increase liquidity. Ultimately, the bank’s reserve ratio fell below 10%, which was inadequate to cover its obligations during the downturn.2 Predictably, the Medici bank collapsed in 1494 and resulted in forfeiture of its assets to creditors, a fate shared by other banks engaged in similar fractional reserve banking practices.
A similar instance occurred with the Bank of Amsterdam in 1609. When it was first established, it actually faithfully maintained a 100% cash reserve, in which every deposit was actually backed by the required amount of gold. However, starting around the 1780’s, the bank began to practice fractional reserve banking, due to a need to finance military expenditures. This change drastically reduced its reserve ratio from 100% to less than 25%.3 As a result, within a few years, the bank’s financial stability was compromised, leading to its insolvency and eventual takeover by the city of Amsterdam.
The Bank of England, established in 1694, began as a private institution but was quickly imbued with special privileges that set the template for modern central banking that’s used today. Granted a monopoly on the issuance of banknotes, it became the sole institution with legal tender power, due to collusion between government factions and established banking interests. This unique position allowed the Bank to issue government IOUs as banknotes, which not only represented deposited gold but also served as reserves in themselves. This had the peculiar effect of other banks throughout the country to create even more paper money using the Bank of England’s banknotes as reserves, resulting in a double pyramid scheme, as Tarek El-Diwany describes:
“Due to its perceived soundness, the Bank of England’s notes were often used by the so-called country banks (those operating outside London) as part of their reserves. A double pyramid of money supply expansion thus came to operate. Let us imagine that, for every one pound of gold held at the Bank of England, three pounds of Bank of England paper money were created. If now, for every one pound of Bank of England paper money held in a country bank, three pounds of country bank notes were issued, then for every one pound of gold at the Bank of England a maximum of nine pounds of bank money could come into circulation.”
El-Diwany, Tarek. The Problem with Interest, 3rd edition. Kreatoc Ltd. p. 49.
It’s fascinating to also note that this dual capability facilitated the creation of additional banknotes, effectively multiplying the money supply and allowing the bank to earn interest twice—once from the issuance of government notes and again from banknotes backed by these government notes.4 This mechanism of profiting from interest through money supply expansion was a prime motivator for the Bank of England to continue engaging in the practice of fractional reserve banking, echoing the way goldsmiths once profited from interest-bearing loans rather than through direct money creation.
Predictably, the bank’s operations soon revealed inherent risks in this system. Just two years after its inception, the Bank was permitted to suspend specie payments, meaning it could refuse depositor demands to withdraw their gold, even if it was technically insolvent. In 1708, this privilege was further cemented when Parliament prohibited other banks from issuing demand notes, ensuring no competition for the Bank of England.5 As a result, the Bank evolved into a full-fledged central bank and it continually issued more notes and profited from the interest accrued through this expansive money creation mechanism, despite several insolvencies that occurred after.
We want to reiterate that the proliferation of fractional reserve banks occurred concurrently with the widespread acceptance of usury. This is no coincidence; usury was essential for the spread of fractional reserve banking. The historical examples we’ve discussed so far lead one to realize that the prohibition of usury had a valid basis and rational justification, as the introduction of usury-enabled banking led to significant harm, including insolvencies, financial instability, and systemic banking collapses.
Before moving on, we want to highlight an important aspect of central banking as it relates to perpetual warfare. With the establishment of the central bank in England, the nation found itself increasingly involved in wars, participating in conflicts for 63 of the 126 years between 1689 and 1815.6 This period of frequent warfare correlates strongly with the adoption and enforcement of fractional reserve banking, which facilitated government borrowing from the central bank rather than relying on direct taxation to fund wars and other national expenditures. Governments became the primary borrowers from the central bank, opting for debt over taxes to finance their activities. Bank financiers, who stood to gain significantly from interest payments made possible through fractional reserve banking, often encouraged this government indebtedness. More troubling is the evidence that these financiers not only funded wars but oftentimes provided loans to both sides of conflicts, thus profiting from the entire affair while also influencing political decisions by attaching specific conditions to their loans. This practice allowed them to collect steady interest payments and benefit from early access to newly created money, and this gave them a substantial economic advantage before the new money permeated the broader economy. This intertwining of banking and government policy highlights a darker aspect of central banking’s role in national affairs, particularly in the context of prolonging military engagements and increasing the scale of resulting casualties.
G. Edward Griffin describes this pattern as the “Rothschild formula,” a strategy primarily associated with the Rothschild banking family, who were known for funding both sides of various conflicts. Griffin encapsulates this strategy:
“The mark of the Rothschild Formula is unmistakable in these conflicts. The monetary scientists often were seen financing both sides. Whether ending in victory or defeat, the outcome merely preserved or restored the European “balance of power.” And the most permanent result of any of these wars was expanded government debt for all parties.”
Griffin, G. Edward. The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve. 5th ed., American Media, 2010. Chapter 11, “Perpetual War in Eighteenth Century England” section.
The Rothschilds, by instigating conflicts and then financing both sides, were able to profit from the interest on the loans provided to warring nations. This cold blooded scheme allowed them to capitalize on the economic outcomes regardless of the conflict’s victor. The consequent debt accumulation by nations ensured ongoing influence and profit for the bankers. While the detailed implications of this scheme on the development and operation of central banking are beyond the scope of this chapter, it is important to recognize that this practice of funding both sides of warring nations continues today, and it is enabled by widespread usurious central banking. In any case, let us now proceed with our exploration of the history of banking in the United States.
Central banking in the U.S. began with the establishment of the Bank of North America, driven through the Continental Congress by Robert Morris in the spring of 1781. It was modeled after the Bank of England, meaning that it held a monopoly on the issuance of paper money and primarily lending to the federal government. Morris’s vision was for the bank to provide cheap credit for him and his allies, effectively consolidating financial control. However, by the end of 1783, as Morris’s political influence waned, the Bank of North America transitioned from a central bank to a private commercial bank, ending its original function.7
In the late 1780s, the Federalists, replacing the decentralized Articles of Confederation with a new Constitution, advocated for interventionist economic policies, including high tariffs, domestic taxes, and public works. A central element of their strategy involved the creation of the First Bank of the United States in 1791, spearheaded by Alexander Hamilton, a follower of Morris. The federal government owned a fifth of the bank’s shares. Like its predecessor, the First Bank issued massive amounts of paper money and demand deposits based on only $2 million in specie, and it loaned millions to the government, fueling widespread inflation and prompting the emergence of numerous commercial banks, which of course further expanded the money supply.8
Despite its economic impact, the First Bank of the United States faced significant opposition and its charter renewal in 1811 was narrowly defeated by votes in both the House and Senate, influenced by the Democratic-Republicans. The U.S. entered the War of 1812 shortly thereafter, which led to a massive expansion of banks and banknotes to finance the war effort. These banks were highly leveraged in that they issued large volumes of new notes to purchase government bonds, but they became insolvent when depositors demanded specie. Unlike in a free banking system, the government intervened to prevent the collapse of these banks, allowing them to continue operating despite failing to meet their obligations. G Edward Griffin describes this scene:
“The state banks had created enough instant money for the federal government to raise the debt from $45 million to $127 million, a staggering sum for the fledgling nation. Tripling the money supply, with no appreciable increase in goods, means the value of the dollar shrank to about one-third of its former purchasing power. By 1814, when the depositors began to awake to the scam and demanded their gold instead of paper, the banks closed their doors and had to hire extra guards to protect officials and employees from the angry crowds. Once again, the monetary and political scientists had succeeded in fleecing the American public of approximately 66% of all the money they held during that period, and that was on top of the 42% fleecing they got a few years earlier by the bank of the United States.”
Griffin, G. Edward. The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve. 5th ed., American Media, 2010. Chapter 16, “The War of 1812” section.
This chaotic financial state after the war paved the way for the establishment of the Second Bank of the United States, which sought to restore some order to the country’s banking system.
Chartered by President James Madison in 1816, the Second Bank of the United States was established in a more competitive environment, contending with state banks that were well-established by then. This competition was exacerbated as several states imposed heavy taxes on banks within their borders that were chartered outside of the state, a move aimed at curbing the influence of the national bank. This led to the landmark Supreme Court case McCulloch v. Maryland. Maryland contended that the bank was unconstitutional because the federal government did not have the explicit power to charter a bank. The court decided in favor of the bank, with McCulloch arguing that the central bank was necessary for Congress to execute its constitutionally granted powers, thus affirming the legality of nationally chartered banks despite ongoing constitutional debates.
The operations of the Second Bank of the United States, however, soon led to significant controversy and conflict, particularly during the Bank Panic of 1819 when the bank called in its credit, which exacerbated financial instability. The bank’s charter was up for renewal in 1836, and this set the stage for a fierce political battle between President Andrew Jackson and the bank’s chairman, Nicholas Biddle. Biddle, in an attempt to save the bank, extended fraudulent advances to congressmen and courted influential members of the press, while Jackson systematically drained federal deposits from the bank, prompting Biddle to contract credit further in retaliation, which of course, he blamed on President Jackson. This conflict culminated in Biddle’s arrest and charges of fraud, leading to the termination of the Second Bank of the United States. This effectively left the U.S. without a central bank until 1913, when the Federal Reserve was established. However, to provide context and groundwork for understanding the origins of the Federal Reserve, it is essential to first examine the development of banking during and after the U.S. Civil War.
After the closing of the Second Bank of the United States, the period leading up to the Civil War, often referred to as the free banking era, was not truly free banking. It was decentralized to some extent but it was still highly controlled and regulated, with suspensions of specie payments and government bailouts for insolvent banks.9
During the early years of the Civil War, the Union primarily financed its efforts by issuing ‘greenbacks’ and printing paper money, leading to the suspension of specie payments, similar to the pre-war “free banking” era. As banks continued to become insolvent, the Union needed a more consistent way to fund the war. Jay Cooke, a prominent banker, played a crucial role in this effort by promoting the National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864. These acts established a banking system where money supply expansion was directly tied to the banks’ purchase of government bonds rather than greenbacks.
The shift from using banknotes to interest-bearing government bonds as reserves was a natural progression, likely driven by the need to incentivize holding bonds over gold. The interest returns provided a compelling reason for individuals to prefer bonds over physical gold. This development once again illustrates that the prohibition of interest had to be circumvented to allow for the proliferation of fractional reserve banking and paper money, and the subsequent establishment of the Federal Reserve. Speaking of the Federal Reserve, Murray Rothbard notes how this Civil War era national banking system paved the way for this institution:
“Whereas greenbacks were finally eliminated by the resumption of specie payments in 1879, the effects of the national banking system are still with us. Not only as this system in place until 1913, but it paved the way for the Federal Reserve System by instituting a quasi-central banking type of monetary system. The “inner contradictions” of the national banking system impelled the U.S. either to go on to a frankly central bank or to scrap centralized banking altogether and go back to decentralized state banking. Given the inner dynamic of state intervention, coupled with the common adoption of a statist ideology after the turn of the twentieth century, the course the nation would take was unfortunately inevitable”
Rothbard, Murray. The Mystery of Banking. 2nd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008. p. 222.
It’s also interesting to note that another source of funding for the civil war came from the Rothschild family, applying the “Rothschild formula” referenced to earlier, where they funded both sides of the war. A certain August Belmont, who served as an agent to the Rothschild family interests in the U.S., engaged in profiting from war bonds.10 Griffin gives details about Belmont’s financial activities during the Civil War:
“Belmont had placed large amounts of Rothschild money into the bonds of state-sponsored banks in the South. Those bonds, of course, had fallen in value to practically zero. As the war shifted in favor of the North, however, he began to buy up as many additional bonds as he could, paying but a few pennies on each dollar of face value. It was his plan to have the Union force the Southern states at the end of the war to honor all of their pre-war debt obligations—in full. That, of course, would have been a source of gigantic speculative profits to the Rothschilds. Meanwhile, on the northern side of the Mason-Dixon Line, Belmont became the chief agent for the sale of Union bonds in England and France. It was rumored that, when Belmont called on President Lincoln and personally offered Rothschild money at 27 1/2 per cent interest, he was rudely thrown out of the office. The story is doubtful, but it represents a larger truth. Profiting from war and placing money on both sides of the conflict were exactly the kinds of maneuvers for which the Rothschilds had become famous throughout Europe and were now practicing in America.”
Griffin, G. Edward. The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve. 5th ed., American Media, 2010. Chapter 19, “Income Taxes and War Bonds” section.
We can observe that the implementation of central banking, particularly with interest-bearing bonds as its foundation, enables short-term exploitation at the cost of long-term investment and societal wellbeing. Central banking inherently supports high time preference, with governments eager to raise funds through reckless borrowing, disregarding future consequences. This system also incentivizes outsiders like the Rothschilds to meddle in and escalate conflicts. At the turn of the 20th century, wars were no longer about enacting justice or promoting fairness. Enabled by the fractional reserve banking system, wars primarily serve to enrich the banking class, allowing them to profit through interest and amass political power over nations. In such a system, the focus is solely on profiting from debt and monetary supply expansion, driven by the money changers who gain from usury.
This Civil War era national banking system created three tiers of national banks: central reserve city banks in New York, reserve city banks, and country banks, each with specific reserve requirements. This structure allowed banks to earn interest twice—first from government bonds and then from lending out banknotes—creating the familiar pyramid scheme on top of New York’s central reserve banks. Compared to pre-Civil War banking, where banks had to maintain their own specie reserves, the new system centralized reserves and tied note expansion to government bonds. This regime of monetary supply expansion through government bonds basically paved the way for the eventual creation of the Federal Reserve System. However, a critical missing element was a “lender of last resort.” As Murray Rothbard noted, banks needed a “federal government Santa Claus” to bail them out regardless of reckless debt issuance and monetary expansion.11 Banking panics in the late 1800s and early 1900s led statist and progressive politicians to push for a central banking system with such a lender, setting the stage for the emergence of the creature from Jekyll Island.
The creation of the creature from Jekyll Island will be the subject of the next essay InshaAllah.
- De Soto, Jesús Huerta. Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles. 3rd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006. p. 73. ↩︎
- Ibid. 74. ↩︎
- Ibid. 106. ↩︎
- Griffin, G. Edward. The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve. 5th ed., American Media, 2010. Chapter 9, “The Bank of England” section. ↩︎
- Rothbard, Murray. The Mystery of Banking. 2nd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008. p. 181. ↩︎
- Griffin, G. Edward. The Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve. 5th ed., American Media, 2010. Chapter 11, “Perpetual War in Eighteenth Century England” section. ↩︎
- Rothbard, Murray. The Mystery of Banking. 2nd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008. p. 193. ↩︎
- Ibid. p. 194. ↩︎
- See chapter 14 of Rothbard’s The Mystery of Banking for a discussion on why this period was not truly free banking. ↩︎
- It’s telling that, as of the time of writing, the Wikipedia entry for August Belmont mentions that he earned his nickname of “King of the Money Changers” due to being a skilled arbitrageur. ↩︎
- Rothbard, Murray. The Mystery of Banking. 2nd ed., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008. p. 230. ↩︎








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